Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up - Softcover

Ron Lock is an esteemed author of many Zulu warfare histories. He lives in Kwazulu-Natal where he has been a guide to the historical battlefields of the province for over fifteen years.

This is an important book in the genre of the Anglo-Zulu War. The authors - Ron Lock & Peter Quantrill - through meticulous research, have recreated the events surrounding the shocking military defeat suffered by the British army at Isandlwana on the 22nd of January, 1879, at the hands of the warriors of the Zulu king, Cetshwayo. The Zulu campaign was planned by Ntshingwayo - a superb commander - who out thought, and out fought the British commander, Lord Chelmsford. What is remarkable, the authors point out, is that the British were armed with modern weapons, such as breechloading rifles, machine guns, cannons and rocket batteries, whilst the Zulu warriors were armed with a short stabbing spear, and a cowhide shield. And yet, the Zulu commander - Ntshingwayo - knowing exactly what his warriors faced, nevertheless devised an efficient and ruthless military plan that saw Lord Chelmsford fatally split his force, and through the use of the Zulu formation of the 'horns of the buffolo', descended upon the British camp at Isandlwana, destroying it in around 2 hours of fighting, that saw the British force destroyed, (just 50 Europeans managed to flee to neighbouring Natal), and Chelmsford's military reputation in tatters. The hardback (2002) edition, contains 336 numbered pages and is comprised of 9 chapters, separated into 3 sections: Part One - The Conflict. Part Two - The Battle. Part Three - The Cover-up. There are 3 appendices, and the book contains very good pictures and illustrations. The authors approach this battle from the perspective of a Zulu victory, rather than the usual approach of British defeat. This is to counter the search for excuses for the British defeat - excuses that usually evolve around a sense of incomprehension and scape goating - rather than admitting that the result was the consequence of superb Zulu planning and execution. After the battle, Lord Chelmsford and his immediate staff conspired to hide the truth of the chain of events that led to the disaster itself. Through clear research and analysis, the authors demonstrate that the blame for the defeat resides firmly at Lord Chelmsford's door, and that he, as over-all British military commander in the field, was responsible for underestimating the Zulu capacity to make war, and that this inadequate assessment led to the deaths of hundreds of men under his command. This book pays tribute to the Zulu people, and exposes imperial hypocracy and the under-belly of colonial rule. One very unique attribute to this book is that it carries an Introduction, written by Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, MP. This gentleman explains that the Zulus never saw the British as 'enemies', and that the king - Cetshwayo - did not understand why British forces had invaded his homeland, or why the British and Zulus had to fight, when previously, very good relations had existed between the two peoples. A fine book of much academic merit. --ShiDaDao Ph.D

The Battle of Isandlwana was by far the worst defeat ever suffered by the British Army at the hands of a Native Force, How could it have happened? A British Army which had the most up to date weapons including Artillery completely destroyed by a native force using spears and shields. This Book attempts to answer this question and does a good job of it to. As a member of a re-enactment group called the 'Die-Hard Company' who turn out as soldiers of the 24th Foot and went to South Africa in January 1999 - We hope to go again in January 2004 - I often get asked questions about what happened Isandlwana and if I can reccommend any books about the battle. The Authors of this work have really worked hard to give a accurate and fair account of what happened at Isandlwana and how after the batttle the British Commanders tried to pass the blame for the defeat from themselves to others who were conveniently dead. The other strong point of this book is the authors attempt to end the debate on the ammo supply faliure at Isandlwana. This subject has been a place of real augument for years with historians split right down the middle about it. Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill examine the debate and give a very good account of what probably happened although I doubt it will end the debate. Overall this is a really good read and comes highly reccommended. As a last point I often get asked if the British learned the lesson of Isandlwana. The answer is NO! for less than a year later in Afganistan the British suffered another defeat which was almost an exact copy of Isandlwana - It's name? MAIWAND! --A G. Fermor

brilliant book could not put it down one of the best books I own. best book on Zulu wars ever read. will be keeping to read time and time again --alice